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Leader Groups in American Law
Max Rheinsteint

If one surveys the major legal systems of the world, he finds that each
has been molded by a particular group of leaders. Private gentlemen of
leisure and, later on, high-ranking officers of the administration left
their imprint on the law of ancient Rome. Theologians like Islamic
mullahs, Jewish rabbis, and Hindu Brahmins shaped the sacred laws
of their secular communities. The law of England was made by the
judges of the royal courts. European continental laws received their
characteristic features through the work of learned scholars, from the
days of Irnerius down to the Pandectists of the nineteenth century. Max
Weber, who traced these influences on a worldwide scale,1 called these
shapers of the law the Rechtshonoratioren (honoratiores of the law).
In his inquiry into the roles played by judges and scholars in structuring the legal systems of England, France, and Germany, John P.
Dawson speaks of the Oracles of the Law.2 Such unfamiliar terms may
be useful to describe so novel a concept. A common term like "leader
groups" may easily evoke erroneous ideas. But I still prefer it, and the
meaning with which it is used here will, I hope, emerge from the
following discussion of familiar facts of American history.
Heinrich Triepel3 in Germany and Karl N. Llewellyn 4 and Gerhard
0. W. Mueller 5 in this country have shown that characteristic styles
exist in legal systems as well as in art and literature. One would expect
such differing patterns since creation, application, and development
of law partake of the character of art. The style by which the legal art
is characterized depends, just as in painting or in poetry, on the identity
t Max Pam Professor of Comparative Law Emeritus. The University of Chicago. A
German version of this article was presented to the Gesellschaft ftir Rechtsvergleichung
(Society of Comparative Law) at its September, 1969 meeting in Regensburg, Bavaria, and
was published in 34 RABELs ZrrscHmuFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES
UND INTERNATIONAES
PRiVATRrCHT 1 (1970).
1 M. WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SociET'Y (Rheinstein ed. 1967).

2 J. P. DAWSON, OArCES OF TH
447 (1970).

LAW (1968), reviewed, Rheinstein, 18 Am. J. Comp. L.

3 H. TnmEL, Vom STIL DES RECrTS (1970).

4 Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Law, 9 U. CH. L. REv. 224 (1941).
5 G.O.W.

MuELLER, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1970).
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of the artists. The words of Rudolph Wifith6lter recently reminded me
of the diversity of legal styles: "We do not have to harbor any fear that
members of the legal system will bring about a change of the social
order. Quite the contrary, society is being stabilized and the status quo
is maintained primarily by means of the law and the lawyers."'6
As to Germany, this proposition may contain a grain of truth. For
a considerable period it also would have been applicable to England.
But it certainly does not apply to the United States or, to speak more
correctly, to the present third phase of the legal development of the
United States. In that development each of three successive phases is
characterized by the leadership of a particular branch of the legal profession. The impact of these groups is shown so clearly that it provides
a striking illustration of the general role of legal leader groups.
I
The first phase of the legal development of the United States extends
approximately to the Civil War. During this period the leading branch
of the profession was the same as it had been in England, namely the
judiciary. The law that was created by the lordly judges at Westminster
was meant to serve the needs of the big landowners, of big business,
and of the City of London. Until recently the common law of England
had little interest in the needs of little people. Access to the administration of justice was impeded by the high cost. The spirit of the common
law was conservative; the judges saw themselves as representatives of
what has now come contemptuously to be called the Establishment.
Did any Establishment exist in the early period of the United
States? It certainly did in the South where economic, political, and
social power lay with the slave-owning planters of cotton and tobacco.
Perhaps one could also find an Establishment in New York, Philadelphia, or Boston where a commercial community had begun to play
an economically and politically significant role. However, the North
and even more the Western frontier, as they continuously increased
in population density and prosperity, were wide open geographically
and socially. The society in these regions fluctuated and vacillated between the anarchic inclinations of the adventurers and the desire for
a fixed order of those settlers of the cities and farms who had attained
prosperity.
Generally, American society was colorful, tumultuous, anti-authoritarian, and passionately adverse to privileges of birth or status. This
social climate was reflected in the spirit of the legal profession and
consequently in that of the bench, the major part of which emerged
6 DEE SPIEGF.L, No. 32, 1969, at 99.
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through popular election. Only reluctantly can one apply the term

"jurist" or even "lawyer" to the large and heterogenous fold of the
bench and bar in the period around 1840. The major part of its members were craftsmen of legal practice, and their training was that of
craftsmen. The typical lawyer began his career as an apprentice in the
office of an attorney, was used as a messenger boy, clerk, or office helper,
watched the "master" in court, and copied more or less established
forms of contracts, conveyances, and wills. In addition, he perhaps read
the four volumes of the American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries. When he felt ready for the bar examination, which was not
overly difficult, he made a first try and as many repeated efforts as necessary. After admission to the bar he practiced more or less ably, engaged
in politics, and, once the necessary contacts with influential persons
had been established, he ran for political or judicial office.
The law and its administration underwent a transformation from an
esoteric art into a popular craft. But the astonishing fact is that the
law did not become chaotic. Continuity with the common law of
England was preserved even though the law had to be adapted to the
needs of a rapidly developing country of different geographic, political,
and social conditions. A great majority of the judges combined the
technique of the common law, which they had acquired through practical observation and training, with the fine finger-tip sense for the
needs of a given situation which they had developed through experience in political life. In addition, the members of the bar and the
bench also comprised quite a few men who had received solid legal
training in England and who, in one of the growing number of American colleges, had acquired the humanistic education that was required
of the upper classes. John Marshall, Joseph Story, Lemuel Shaw,
Roger Taney, Daniel Webster, and Rufus Choate are just a few outstanding examples. Such persons attained leadership through their
intellectual superiority, through their ability clearly to express their
thoughts in cultured English, and through their knowledge of the
world, including the legal culture of the European continent.
The confluence of these various elements produced a judge-made
law that often widely differed from the English model. The command
of the binding effect of precedent was taken less seriously than in
England, and legal thinking did not move exclusively along the channels of strict case analogy. Philosophical and technical concepts, at
times of broad generality, came to be used. Decisions, especially innovative ones, tended to be justified by reference to principles of natural
law or political theory. Both branches of the common law, the English
and the American, were made essentially by judges. However, Amer-
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ican judges were different from their English counterparts, and consequently the law that they created assumed a style which diverged from
that of the law of England.
II

With the victory of the increasingly industrialized North over the
capitalist-agrarian South, American legal life entered the second phase,
in which leadership shifted to a new group. As the land was opened
and the growth of industry accelerated, the high financiers and industrialists became progressively more powerful. Positions on the bench
became less attractive. Men of vitality and creative energy, attracted by
the economy, devoted themselves to developing the resources of the
country. For the legal mind of outstanding ability it became more
attractive and rewarding to place himself at the service of business, and
thus to occupy a leading position in the economy. Candidacy for judicial office was left to mediocre lawyers who were dependent on
political bosses.
This change in the type of leaders influenced the character and
operation of the legal system in two ways. Legal thinking, which until
this time had been highly dynamic and creative, became more rigid.
The law became conservative. Its style as well as its content was altered
in the process. In a pattern similar to that which simultaneously evolved
in England, precedents came no longer to be treated as evaluations of
concrete sets of facts. Weight was given to those conceptual formulations that found expression in judicial opinions. The conceptualistic
style of thinking of the German Pandectists had found its way into
England through the Hanoverian university of Gbttingen. American
legal thought presented that very same trend toward conceptualism or,
to use Weber's terminology, toward formal-rational thinking. The
penetration of this method into American law at the turn of the century confirms Weber's thesis that formal-rational thinking is especially
compatible with the economic system of capitalism. It results in a high
degree of stability of judicial practice, in predictability of judicial decisions, and consequently in the possibility of long-range private economic
planning of credit and investment.
The judges were helpful to capitalist employers not only in the
style of their thinking but also in the contents with which they filled
the legal system. Such active support was consistent with the temper
prevailing among the American people. To them the country presented unlimited possibilities of space, of natural resources, and of
chances, through personal and entrepreneurial initiative, rapidly to
obtain unlimited wealth, or equally rapidly to lose it. Open the door
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to the able, and woe to the unfortunate. He who was rolled over by
the wave was lost. There was no room for a policy of social security or
of help for the weak. The demand was for freedom to build up the
country through courageous enterprise, and the judges answered that
demand. John Roche has shown how well the content of the legal system corresponded to this trend of the times. 7 The leading position in
the legal profession was occupied not by the judges but by the legal
advisors of industry and finance who molded the law, both in content
and form. Although from his vantage point as a French comparatist,
Edouard Lambert believed that the period was characterized by the
government of judges, in fact it was characterized by the government
of general counsel.8
But the transformation of the method, the change from materialrational to formal-rational thinking, was also connected with the rise
of a new group of co-leaders of the law, the academic teachers and
scholars-the professors. Through them American law has been impregnated with traits which are well known in the classical professorial
law of the European continent, especially Germany. They developed
a trend toward clear concepts, consistent definitions, and systematic arrangement. The growth of the professorial influence in the United
States is partly explained by the same factor that gave the continental
European law its character of a book law, a professorial law. In the
United States, as in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe, an
area of uniform culture has been split into a multitude of territories,
each with its own law. And as in Europe, there has existed no superior
court with the power to bring these separate legal systems into uniformity.
The task of preserving the basic unity of American law is served by
such organizations as the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute, and it is assisted
by the personal contacts arising from the multitude of meetings of the
American Bar Association. But the danger of American law being split
up into fifty or more different compartments is being overcome more
effectively by the university law schools and their professors. Until far
into the nineteenth century the English system of apprenticeship
training was the normal system of American legal education. But, building upon foundations laid in the eighteenth century, universities began the task of systematic legal education in the nineteenth century.
Today, although some remnants of the apprentice system persist, and
7 Roche, Civil Liberty in the Age of Enterprise, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 103 (1963); Roche,
EntrepreneurialLiberty and the Commerce Power, 80 U. CH. L. RPv. 680 (1963).
8 E. LAMBERT, Ln GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES (1921).
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part-time study at night school is not uncommon, the normal course of
legal studies is attendance at a university law school. In many university
law schools the students are drawn from the school's own geographic
area, and the local law plays a major role in the curriculum. But nowhere is it taught exclusively. And what is taught in those great national law schools, the students of which are drawn from all parts of
the nation? An attempt to teach the law of every jurisdiction not only
would be impossible, it would be sheer nonsense. What must be cultivated is American law, which is a law that, as such, is in effect everywhere and nowhere. The curriculum necessarily must concentrate on
those elements which are common to the laws of all the states. That
means concentration on the common law tradition-on the principles
and, above all, the method of common law thinking. In stressing these
factors, present-day American legal education resembles European legal
education of the eighteenth century and German legal education of
the nineteenth.
For counsel and guidance the practitioners of the local courts look
to the legal scholars. These scholars are united in a nationwide organization; many of them move from state to state. For all of them American law constitutes the subject matter of their scholarly and teaching
activities. Because the professors are not only the teachers of the
practicing branch of the legal profession but also the guides and advisors, American law, as actually practiced, has begun to assume some
of the traits of a professorial law. It has tended toward systematization
and occasionally toward creation of concepts of high abstraction. In
these respects American law has acquired a certain resemblance to
continental European legal systems.
The new professorial features have found significant expression in
those comprehensive treatises, such as Williston on Contracts, Wigmore
on Evidence, the works of Scott and Bogert on Trusts, and Davis on
Administrative Law, in which American scholars, much in the manner
of their continental European brethren, have presented major branches
of the law. The new trend culminated in the American Law Institute's
Restatement of the Law which attempted to distill the "true" common
law out of the enormous mass of precedents and to present it in the
manner of a systematically arranged code. In this gigantic enterprise it
was natural that professors played the leading role. If the Restatement
had achieved the effect it was hoped it would achieve, American law
would have approached professorial law of European style. But the
success has been limited. The practitioners, accustomed to the traditions of case law, were unwilling fully to submit to the new style. But
the Restatement exists, and it has made an impact on the courts. More-
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over, the large number of participating scholars and practitioners were
strongly stimulated and influenced through the very process of its
creation.
American law professors thus have become influential leaders of
the law. In certain respects this influence has had consequences similar
to those which professorial influence has had in Europe. However, in
the United States the professorial influence has made itself felt in another direction, and this circumstance is due to the transformation
undergone by the American legal scholars.
III
The transformation of the attitudes of the legal scholars coincides
with the transformation of the intellectual and political climate of the
country. Conservative laissez faire is being replaced by a "liberal"
social policy of active governmental interference in favor of groups
which, under the system of laissez faire, had obtained but an unsatisfactory share of the affluence of the nation. The workers were the first
group to obtain such attention, then the ethnic minorities, especially
the Negroes, finally the "poor," whoever they may be.
The country was shaken profoundly by the Great Depression of
1929, which shattered the faith in the irresistible force of automatic
progress. In Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, the government intervened in the economic life of the nation in order to reestablish the
shaken economy. Prior to this time, social scientists had propounded
the idea that social reforms were necessary and that they had to be carried out through active governmental intervention. With the advent
of the New Deal the implementation of this idea became politically
feasible.
The legislative bodies appeared, at first, to be the natural carriers
of the new policy. But two kinds of obstacles stood in the way. First,
legislators inclined to proceed with social reforms met with the resistance of conservative judges who frustrated essential parts of social
reform by declaring the pertinent laws unconstitutional. This judicial
resistance was eventually overcome. But the second obstacle remained;
in many cases legislatures were disinclined to initiate social reforms,
even when such reforms were politically inevitable. For example, although the legislatures in general were willing to assist labor, Southern
legislatures were unwilling to repeal racially discriminatory laws, even
if such repeal was made necessary by the impact upon the United States
of postwar world opinion.
Something had to be done and, since no one else was willing or able
to do what had become inevitable, the courts had to step in to fill the
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gap. The Supreme Court of the United States made the first strides,
which were followed by the lower federal courts and ultimately by the
state courts. The judicial tendency to give serious consideration to
political values reemerged, and its reemergence was facilitated by the
case law tradition. Judges working within the framework of case
law must constantly search for analogies between the case at bar and
the existing precedents. During the earlier part of the twentieth century the analogies were widely found in similarities of an abstract and
conceptual character. But quite easily, or one might even say naturally,
analogies may be discovered in the similarity of ideological value judgments. This method of legal reasoning had never been lost in American case law, even though it was temporarily pushed into the background. It became dominant again when it began to correspond to the
ideas of the new legal leaders, the professors.
The last forty years have seen a dramatic rise of the professorial influence in the United States. It was strengthened when law teachers like
Rutledge, Douglas, Frankfurter, Schaefer, O'Connell, and Traynor were
called or elected to high judicial positions. At the same time the new
leader group also became potent in legislation and administration. Professors began sitting on the committees charged with the preparation or
reform of legislation, and when a professor sits on a committee he is
likely to exercise a leading influence. In the administration as well as
in government agencies, professors were called to policy-making positions which they would occupy for a number of years until they returned to their universities or became business lawyers.
The new professorial influence took a direction different from that
which professors had exercised in the preceding phases of American
law. This change was caused by the transformation that occurred in
the ideology and the methods of legal learning, and that transformation
was, in turn, caused by the general change in the ideologies dominant
in the nation. In addition, two special factors of American legal education explain the emergence of professors as protagonists of reform
rather than defenders of the status quo. The first is the invention of
a new method of instruction. Under the case method, the law is not presented through academic lectures which would require systematic organization and conceptual fixation. Instead, the opinions of appellate
courts are discussed and subjected to trenchant critique. In this process
one is not satisfied with conceptual analysis. Inevitably, one begins to
search for the policy reasons by which the judges were moved, and one
seeks to discover the ways in which life is actually being affected by the
work of the courts. One learns to read between the lines, to look at the
case as an attempt to resolve a conflict between divergent interests of

HeinOnline -- 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 694 1970-1971

1971]

American Leader Groups

different groups. One tries to discover the reason why a judge has favored one group over another, or the manner in which he has sought to
work out a compromise between them. One tries to predict what influence the decision is likely to have on economic or social reality. One
learns that voluntaristic elements stand behind the alleged compulsion
of the conceptualistic formulae-in other words, that judges have
power. Thus comes the realization that judges, through their decisions,
can influence the course of social life, can restructure society, can be
social engineers.
The second factor of American legal education which explains the
active role of professors in social reform is the interaction between
American legal learning and the social sciences, which had been growing vigorously in the United States. This development first found expression in the sociological jurisprudence advocated by Roscoe Pound,
and then, in a more radical way, in the realist movement of the 1930's.
The interaction resulted from the admission practices of the leading
law schools, which all began to require attendance at a college as a
necessary preliminary to admission. In all colleges social studies became a necessary part of the curriculum. The familiarity with social
science consequently acquired was carried over in law school into the
critical discussion of cases. It was exercised in the classroom as well as
in the study of the scholar. Integration of the social sciences with
legal learning was vociferously demanded. Social scientists joined law
school faculties. Teamwork by representatives of the two branches of
learning was at times vigorously pursued. As social scientists worked
toward objective insight into social reality, they discovered that the
American Dream had not been as fully achieved as the public was
inclined to believe. Sizable groups of the population had not reached
full participation in the achievements of the Century of Progress. This
realization caused many social scientists to become political "liberals"
-advocates of social reform through government action. And for the
representatives of the social science of law, the courtroom became the
vortex of policy formulation.
As a result of the case method of legal education and the integration
of law and social science, in the present third phase of American legal
development the judges are more in need of professorial guidance than
ever before. The case method bestows a peculiar character upon the
work of the American legal scholar, namely an awareness that judging, especially appellate judging, involves creation of law. This awareness accounts for his primary interest in the possibilities of settling
social conflicts and in thus establishing the good society upon the demo.
cratic pattern. Accordingly, the legal scholar devotes himself to the
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monographic investigation of relationships between law and life. His
research is legal fact research in which social science methods are used
extensively. This kind of research cannot be performed by busy
judges, who in their daily work have to deal with a great variety of
problems. It requires the attention of specialists who have the time to
become experts-in other words, the professors. American law consequently tends to become a professorial law, but a professorial law that
differs widely from the European law that existed in the heyday of
European professorial influence.
CONCLUSION

One who tries to understand the American law of today must know
who its leaders are, by what ideas and ideals they are inspired, and in
what ways they exercise their influence. What applies to the American
law of the present also applies to the past phases of its development.
Each of these periods had its own kind of leaders and consequently its
own peculiar character. Understanding these facts and relationships
opens up awareness of essential features of legal history. It also opens
up awareness of essential characteristics of legal orders of different
countries.
Comparative law can no longer be carried on in the method of comparing conceptual elements. Its method can only be functional. The
comparatist must become familiar with the problems of social life and
then must investigate the tools by which the world's different legal
orders seek to solve these problems. He will also be interested in the
results achieved with the various tools. He has come to recognize that
law is not an autonomous phenomenon capable of being investigated in
isolation from other social phenomena. He knows that law, with all its
rules and institutions, is an aspect of social life, that it must be studied
in its relationship to all the other aspects of a society's cultural climate.
Particularly important is an understanding of the ideologies with which
it is imbued. The task of the comparatist is to develop his feel for these
relationships, to discover and to describe them, to disentangle the
strands of the seamless web of social relationships. This arduous task
is facilitated if, in the study of a particular culture, one interposes between the law and society the human beings who are the mediators
-between them. Of course, the leaders of the law are themselves determined by the structure of the society in question. Systematic observaion of leader groups can thus be the bridge from which one can discover the relationship between a society's cultural climate and its
legal order.
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